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ABSTRACT
Capital availability is not a problem in a well-functioning market.
However, the market for photovoltaic cells is immature; in fact, the
market for grid-connected photovoltaic applications (the primary concern
of this study) does not yet exist. Therefore, the capital markets cannot
easily evaluate the credit-worthiness, the economic attractiveness of the
variety of photovoltaic production processes, research programs, or
end-use applications currently being developed. Only when photovoltaic
technologies converge to a roughly standardized set of mass production
methods and consumer applications will private capital markets perform
their job of allocating financial resources to the photovoltaic
industry. Until then, investigations into the question of capital
availability for this industry must focus on firm-by-firm "case" studies.
This paper examines capital availability for both the production and
consumption sides of this young industry. The experiences of
photovoltaic producers in obtaining and allocating capital are described
for three groups: oil company photovoltaic subsidiaries, electronic firm
subsidiaries, and independent producers. This discussion is based on
telephone and personal interviews with officials of the companies
described.
The capital availability problems of solar thermal consumers provide
a basis for anticipating such problems for future photovoltaic
grid-connected consumers. This basis is used to project the probable
behavior of capital markets once mass production is economically
feasible. Recent Congressional hearings on the creation of a Solar
Energy Development Bank provide the primary backdrop for this discussion.
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It is concluded that given no change in federal programs to support
photovoltaic production and/or consumption, only "large," capital-rich
firms will enter the mass-production of photovoltaic cells. Small
independents can survive only if they are proficient in serving the
specialty, or systems, photovoltaic market. Large firms not currently
active in the photovoltaic industry will enter production through
acquisition or accelerated research programs once the mass-production
market develops and the profit potential is recognized. Finally,
consumers will have difficulty in locating financing for their
photovoltaic purchases for some time after the mass market opens up.
Recommendations include (a) no government subsidies until private
industry defines the best photovoltaics technology, and (b) creation of a
Solar Energy Development Bank after mass markets develop to dissolve the
reluctance of financial intermediaries to lend.
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THE AVAILABILITY OF CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPING PHOTOVOLTAICS MARKETS
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is not currently possible to efine the socially optimal
level of investment in solar technologies because neither the social
benefits to be gained from solar utilization nor the costs necessary
to achieve solar utilization have been aequately defined or
analyzed. "l
This paper addresses the following request as it appears in section
10(c) Part (4) of Public Law 95-590, the Solar Photovoltaic Energy
Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1978.
"(Report on) the availability of private capital at reasonable
interest rates for individuals, businesses, and others desiring to
establish commercial enterprises to manufacture, market, install,
and/or maintain photovoltaic components and systems, or purchase and
install such systems for private, industrial, agricultural,
commercial or other uses..."2
Several problems arise in interpreting this request. These problems
must be iscussed so that we may clarify the purpose of this paper. The
most troublesome language includes:
(a) availability: In a well-functioning market adequate capital
will be available for all projects which are "economic;" that is, if the
expected net cash flows of a project (investment) are discounted at a
rate (or rates if an adjusted present value method is used)3 which
reflects the risk4 of the project, and if the investment's net present
value is positive, then capital will "flow" to the project as investors
attempt to capture part of the positive value. To explore capital
availability for the photovoltaic industry, one must examine risks and
expected returns of specific applications of the technology; that is, the
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type of photovoltaic investment should be specified, thereby identifying
the investment being considered.
In this discussion we address the problems of capital availability
for grid-connected photovoltaic arrays used by residences and commercial
establishments. The development of these massive grid-connected markets
implies a very large decrease in production costs from current levels.
We assume that automated, mass-proauction techniques accomplish this
reduction in cost, and that the level of production cost reached is
$2.80/peak watt (all dollars in 1980 dollars). At this cost "the debate
ends regarding whether or not a market exists for mass-produced
photovoltaics," according to one leading independent producer.5
It is important to note that, in a well-functioning market, when
producers and consumers "agree" on a price which assures an "adequate"
profit for the producer, this producer's problems in obtaining capital
are greatly reduced. This mass-proauction, $2.80/Wp event thus provides
a "watershed" for capital availability to photovoltaics and the ending
point of this analysis. Therefore, we will aress the ifficulties in
attracting capital only until this watershed is reached.
(b) reasonable rates: The rate of return on invested capital
demanded by the investor reflects, as mentioned above, the perceived risk
of the investment as well as the expected return. Investors are
constantly digesting new information on the market portfolio of risky
projects, and required rates of return are continuously reestimated based
on these evaluations. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
market mechanism will set reasonable "interest rates for individuals,
businesses, and others" desiring to produce or consume photovoltaic
products. Using any other assumption would imply that we have better
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information or judgment than the marketplace. In fact, market failures
may exist (see below) which distort the evaluation of the market
regarding photovoltaics. However, these failures, if they exist, should
not persist for long. Therefore, our assumption that reasonable interest
rates on capital for producers and consumers of photovoltaics is the most
prudent assumption we can make. This assumption eliminates the need for
us to provide some artificial methodology for defining reasonable
interest rates for photovoltaics.
(c) individuals, businesses, and others desiring to establish
commercial enterprises . . . or purchase and install . . .: The
development of the photovoltaic industry and the evolution of new
applications of photovoltaics technologies are being carefully watched by
potential producers ant consumers alike. Naturally, when the price of
grid-connectea photovoltaics is low enough to stimulate the demand which
warrants large-scale production, "individual businesses, and others" who
presently have no real interest in photovoltaics will "desire" to save or
provide capital for the industry. However, evidence of the desire to
invest in photovoltaics (or any venture) is reliable only after a price
has been agreed upon and the transaction is made. It is, therefore, not
a very useful exercise to search for those who may provide capital in the
future ana to try to estimate the egree of their esire for investing in
photovoltaics. A useful estimate of this degree is available only at the
time the producer or consumer exercises the right to buy into
mass-produced photovoltaic products. We therefore focus our attention on
currently-operating proaucers of photovoltaic arrays and those businesses
committed to a serious program of research and development in
photovoltaics. In our examination of consumers, we will use consumer
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experience in solar space and water heating to provide information on
their problems in obtaining capital.
In adition to the unclear language used in the directive presented
in Section lO(c) Part (4), two further assumptions must be made to refine
our understanding of the purpose of this paper. First, an assumption
must be made regarding the future role of the federal government in
channeling capital to photovoltaics. Second, a time frame must be
assumed within which we will examine the problem of capital
availability. We therefore employ the following assumptions to further
refine the definition of purpose for this paper:
(1) Federal involvement with photovoltaics producers: We assume
that no major change in federal policy occurs before the watershed
technology is developed. (For example, no major federal procurement plan
is implemented.)
(2) Federal involvement with photovoltaics consumers: Little (if
any) federal funds are used to assist erstwhile consumers of
photovoltaics products. However, the potential for such assistance is
contained in legislation pending in both the United States House and
Senate. These bills include H.R. 605, also known as the "Solar Energy
Development Bank Act," and Senator Henry Jackson's "Omnibus Energy Bill,"
S. 1308. These pending schemes employ interest rate subsidies and
therefore would affect the availability of "private" capital to
photovoltaics. We will explore the possible effects of this kind of
federal action in the private capital market.
(3) An estimate of the number of years required to reach $2.80/Wp
is, of course, impossible to suggest with much certainty. The duration
of the struggle to decrease photovoltaics production costs is a function
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not only of the production and consumption technologies which are
assumed, but also of the price of alternative fuels. The higher the
price of substitutes, the sooner markets will develop for grid-connected
photovoltaics. Most significantly, the price of oil is, of course,
largely etermined outside the marketplace in the realm of international
politics. This greatly complicates the estimation of the approximate
date of the development of markets for grid-connected photovoltaics ana
the price at which these markets will appear. However, it is reasonable
to assume that these markets will evelop some time during the 1980s ana
that the $2.80/Wp price is a reasonable prerequisite to successful
photovoltaic marketing. Therefore, it is assumed that $2.80/Wp is
realized in the 1980s.
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II. DISCUSSIONS WITH PHOTOVOLTAIC PRODUCERS WHICH ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF
OBTAINING CAPITAL
The purposes of this paper are addressed by first discussing capital
availability with existing producers of photovoltaics. These
discussions, which took place in person and by telephone, explore past,
present, and potential issues of capital availability for the
photovoltaic industry. The conclusion of this section will address the
longer-term capital availability issues as they will be affected by the
probable composition of the industry. (In Section III we focus on
consumers of photovoltaics.)
"A limited amount of effort has been devoted to documenting the
extent of current private investment in solar technologies . . . No
information is collected on the extent of private investment on
production facilities, research and development, or future private
industry plans. This and other information are essential if the
extent of current and future private investment in solar energy
technologies is to be adequately aescribea."6
It should not be surprising that information on the capital
allocation process in the photovoltaic industry is scarce, for the
industry is composed of a collection of closely held private
organizations and wholly-ownea subsidiaries embedded within larger
firms. Neither of the photovoltaic industry subsets (the independents or
the subsidiaries) is, in general, pressured by (a) private investors who
are not also managers or (b) federal agency investor watchdogs (the SEC
in particular) to defend management decisions at shareholder meetings, or
in annual reports and lOK forms. Therefore, since (a) independents are
managed or closely monitored by a few owners, and (b) subsidiary
photovoltaic groups are currently "insignificant" components of the firms
which own then, little information on the financial management of
photovoltaics industry participants is publicly available.
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The early stage in the evolution of the technology -- and therefore
of the industry -- determines this current organizational configuration.
Neither a photovoltaics production or generation technology has surfaced
as the 'standard' for the industry. Therefore, research and development
is a primary activity within the industry and will continue to be until a
major decrease in cost is accomplished. This R&D function requires a
secrecy which adds to the difficulty of completing a worthwhile study of
the industry at this time.
The purpose of this section is to dissolve as much of this corporate
secrecy as is possible in order to describe the problems, if any, of
photovoltaic firms and subsidiaries in finding the capital required to
reach the automated production stage. This purpose is accomplished by
discussing the industry participants' (a) experience with the search for
capital to date, and (b) projections of the future configuration of the
industry and associated future capital allocation problems. This case
study approach makes it difficult to form generalities which would tend
to mislead observers of this young, rapidly changing industry.
We concentrate on three groups of photovoltaics producers:
independents, oil company subsidiaries, and electronics company
subsidiaries. These groups represent major factions in the competition
for product development and markets, and therefore are an adequate sample
for our discussion. However, we may not assume that these three factions
will not be joined by other kinds of firms as the photovoltaic industry
matures. No one can predict what types of firms will enter this business
(especially through acquisition) once large markets develop and the
business becomes profitable. This underscores the limitations of the
assumptions used below regarding future composition of the industry.
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A. Capital Availability Experience to Date
No one is sure of either the total number of participant
organizations in the photovoltaic industry (estimates range between 14
and 20) or the number of those which are independents (up to 13).7
This imprecision is characteristic of most new industries as new ventures
spin off of old, firms succumb to competition for the few markets that do
exist, and new, principally R&D, ventures enter the race without
fanfare. Four independent producers, Solarex, Optimal Coating
Laboratories, Inc. (OCLI), Solenergy, and Sollos Incorporatea, were
contacted for their insights into the capital availability issues which
are pertinent to independents. These insights suggest that variety
characterizes the subset of independents much as it does the entire
industry.
The capital availability problem "does not exist" for Solarex,
according to an official of this largest, and perhaps most aggressive
independent. Two corporate European investors each recently purchased a
one-sixth interest in Solarex worth over $3 million. 8 In addition,
Solarex recently announced purchase of a similar interest by Standard Oil
of Indiana. These minority positions were sold, according to this
source, to provide the capital necessary to move into the
"mass-production" phase of the business. It is clear that, for Solarex,
"no problem" exists in raising private capital "for this purpose."
While the original investors in Solarex could have "retired as
millionaires" had they accepted one of the several buy-out offers from
major firms proposed over recent years, Solarex is "determined to remain
independent." A similar resolve, perhaps varying only in degree, is
characteristic of other independents and provides the only deterrence to
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continued evolution of the industry towards an entirely "subsidiary"
composition. (It is apparent that solicitation of further corporate
investment would probably reduce the ownership of the original Solarex
investors to a minority position.) The possibility of changes in this
resolve clearly exists and should be monitored since such change will
determine the fate of the major independents in the photovoltaic
industry.
The Corporate Controller of CLI9 states that equity capital, such
as that successfully won by Solarex, is currently the only reasonable
source of capital for the photovoltaic industry. Major debt positions
are "out of the question" because lenders do not believe independents are
good risks for their money. It is too early in the development of
photovoltaics markets to seek debt support for plans to expand to a
mass-production phase because reliable rates forecasts are impossible to
construct -- the markets do not exist.
OCLI has solved this problem in a manner different from Solarex.
Having spun off its photovoltaics subsidiary as Applied Solar Energy
Corp., (ASEC), ASEC sold out an underwritten public offering of 770,000
units at approximately $10 per unit. Each unit consists of one share of
newly issued common stock of ASEC and a ten year warrant to purchase
another share of common.10 (It is not clear at what price the warrant
may be executed.) This public offering is a major event for the
photovoltaics industry since it provides a signal of the public's
perception of the commercial potential of photovoltaics. The offering's
success could well spark more widespread interest in further financings
of this kind. A major source of capital would then be available to other
reputable independents.11
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Solenergy was formed in the spring of 1978 with three partners
contributing a total of $10,000. The president and founder of Solenergy,
Robert Willis, was no newcomer to the industry.12 For five years he
headed Solar Power Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon
Enterprises.
Willis realized he needed a "small" line of credit to get started
and support his operation. He composed a detailed business plan to
support his case with the banks. However, he failed to secure his line
of credit with the first ten "so-called venture capital firms" which he
contacted. He claims that most venture capital suppliers are not
interested in risky new ventures, but rather focus on established but
fast-growing concerns (e.g., Wang Corporation). (Willis finally received
a line of credit from U.S. Trust.).
The banks he contacted had two principal concerns. First, they were
completely unfamiliar with photovoltaic technology, and were unwilling to
spend the time necessary to understand its production and application.
Willis claims that only U.S. Trust actually read his business plan. Some
bankers complained that a business plan for a new firm in a new industry
was obsolete before printed. Second, the banks were worried about
Solenergy's considerable competition. They wondered how a small business
could compete with subsidiaries of Mobil, Exxon, Shell, Arco, Motorola,
and Texas Instruments. Willis was not successful in convincing the banks
that the survival of a small photovoltaics business would be possible if
it offered specialized products to be customized to the consumers'
needs. This latter point emphasizes that the nature of the competition
is critical to the question of capital availability. Banks want to back
winners. It is therefore necessary for undercapitalized industry
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newcomers to demonstrate to banks their ability to prosper, perhaps by
serving specialized markets which larger firms may not want to serve.
Sollos Incorporated, a small independent headed by Milo Macha,
survives in just this way. Macha produces small photovoltaics orders
for specializea, mostly foreign markets (i.e., wire-fence electrification
in Sweden).1 3 He has been approached by several foreign firms and
governments (from Greece, Sweden, and Switzerland) who are interested in
larger orders than Sollos is now able to produce. Although Macha has
"avoided seeking outside capital" to date, he believes that such external
capital will be necessary to permit him to expand production and win
these lucrative potential contracts abroad. However, Macha is concerned
that obtaining the contracts will be "very aifficult" at best.
It is therefore clear that among the industry's independents are
firms with vastly different approaches and attitudes towaras securing
private capital for their businesses. As we turn our attention to
subsidiary photovoltaic operation, we will see this range of
characteristics broaden.
B. Photovoltaics Subsidiaries of Oil Companies
The five major oil companies which house photovoltaic subsidiaries
are among the most liquid and most creditworthy of private
institutions.14 For their photovoltaics subsidiaries, therefore, the
capital availability problem is not one of locating and securing capital
outside the firm; it is one of competing among other new-product
subsidiaries within the firm for internal funds. This internal capital
allocation process varies among companies and is generally not public
information. Moreover, the process is subject not to the rules of the
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open market, but rather to the strategic program of the oil company.
While it is true that the behavior of the debt and equity markets
responds to investors' perceptions of a corporation's strategic program,
even if the investor's perceptions of the managers' total corporate
strategy are correct (and they may not be), it would be very difficult to
identify those investor responses which are motivated solely by the
photovoltaic component of the strategy. Factors other than the isolated
capital-worthiness of the photovoltaic subsidiary enter into the oil
companies' allocation process. These considerations include managements'
(a) estimation of the public relations value of participating in
photovoltaic research and development; (b) evaluation of longer-term
options to proceed with marketing photovoltaics (capital-rich firms have
the luxury of using longer-term planning horizons than do firms which are
less well-endowed); and (c) assessment of the "strategic fit" of
photovoltaics in their specific oil company. Intra-firm competition for
funds is intense, but the game is played by the rules established by
management--rules which are not necessarily public information. This
section discusses some examples of these rules as they affect
photovoltaic subsidiaries.
Solar Power Corporation, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon
Enterprises, must meet certain criteria established for all new
businesses in Exxon. Performance is measured using after-tax return on
investment on a discounted cash flow basis. The required return varies
according to the estimated risk of the project. In general the weighted
average after-tax cost of capital for Exxon new ventures is 12%. But
Solar Power Corporation "in the long run" will have to earn more than
this 12% because of its greater risk relative to other Exxon ventures.
15
The ROI for Solar Power is not yet defined because the subsidiary is
still "on a negative cash flow basis." Exxon Enterprises will allow a
longer period of negative flows for Solar Power than for other new
product ventures because of the "early stage" of the industry and the
"potential size of the market." In other words, the expected return in
the long run justifies taking the greater risk inherent in the venture.
According to an Exxon spokesman, "We would not get into any business that
we thought would would turn out to be a loser." However, the spokesman
stresses that Solar Power must become profitable before the advent of
domestic gria-connected markets, an event which he believes is "well into
the future." He suggests that foreign grid-connected markets will open
before their domestic counterparts.
In 1975, Mobil Oil Crporation allocated $30 million to Mobil-Tyco
with a mandate to "produce a net positive cash flow within approximately
seven years," (that is, by around 1982). According to Jim McNeil,
president of Mobil-Tyco, this goal is somewhat flexible. He defines a
two-pronged corporate strategy which, if adhered to, will assure Mobil's
continued allocation of capital to Mobil-Tyco. First, in the
"near-term," Mobil-Tyco must be competitive in the markets for existing
photovoltaic applications. Second, Mobil-Tyco must produce at 70C/watt
(in 1980 dollars) in line with the goals of JPL's low-cost photovoltaics
array program.
McNeil believes that Mobil-Tyco's participation in the Low-Cost
Solar Array Program (ana other photovoltaics programs) is crucial to its
continued support from Mobil. This participation conveys a sense of
long-term potential of photovoltaics--a conveyance which reassures Mobil
of the legitimacy of its investments. Therefore, the existence and
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visibility of a national program to support the photovoltaic industry in
its early stages is crucial to the provision of internal capital to the
photovoltaics subsidy by a major oil firm.
Shell's photovoltaic subsidiary, SES, (SES does not produce
photovoltaic cells yet, but is on the threshold of doing so) must
eventually be competitive and profitable in a "very large" market for
Shell to retain its interest in the firm, according to a very reliable
source within Shell. "With no mass market for photovoltaics, our
interest would go to zero." For Shell, therefore, photovoltaics must be
big business. The prospect of profitable operation in the small,
specialized markets of today is not attractive for Shell management. If
it appears that the firm could survive and prosper in specialty markets,
Shell will seek an appropriate buyer.
This desire for participation in a future massive market encouraged
Shell to pursue a cadmium sulfide photovoltaic technology rather than a
silicon-basea method. Cadmium sulfide cells are more easily produced
using mass-production techniques.
Cadmium sulfide, however, presents some unique risks which adversely
affect the chances for eventual profitablilty of SES and therefore
adequate allocation of Shell's capital to it. Cadmium sulfide cells are
less efficient and the material is less chemically stable than silicon.
Normally, Shell uses a discounted cash flow method to evaluate its
new ventures. However, SES "is a very long-run and high-risk project, so
that return on investment is not a very meaningful parameter--there are
too many uncertainties. We are looking at a market that does not really
exist." Eventually, however, SES will have to earn a return higher than
other Shell ventures because of its "unusually" risky characteristics.
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Shell is so uncertain about the future economics of photovoltaics that is
has not projected prices for its photovoltaic products or estimated
Shell's penetration as a fraction of those prices--the process which
Shell normally uses to estimate revenues. It is simply to early to do
this for SES.
C. Photovoltaics Subsidiaries of Electronics Firms
According to a reliable source, the photovoltaics division within
Motorola competes for internal funds with other new ventures based in
large part on one corporate-wiae rate of return on invested capital. In
general, therefore, those new ventures with ROI's greater than this
corporation standard survive, and those that fail to earn the specified
return are eliminated. This policy is softened for photovoltaics,
however, since "so little money is involved." Otherwise, the high risk
of photovoltaics and its recurrent negative cash flows would cause
Motorola to eliminate the project from its corporate budget.
The chances for photovoltaics survival in Motorola are smaller than
in oil firms because (according to this source) (a) the rate of return of
Motorola (and other electronics firms) is higher than that of the oil
industry, and (b) ideas for new ventures are more numerous in Motorola
than in the oil industry in general. Photovoltaics, therefore, is less
of a "standout" technology in the electronics industry than in the oil
business. This point illuminates the competitive internal environment at
Motorola. It further demonstrates that while large pools of capital
exist for photovoltaics in large firms, the internal capital allocation
process may be more rigid and unforgiving than the market in demanding an
invariable return from photovoltaics. However, the continued existence
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of a photovoltaics group within Motorola verifies that management
recognizes potential profit in photovoltaics and is willing to modify
corporate policy (at least for a while) to sustain the option to capture
these future profits.
Texas Instruments (TI) funded internally its research and
development in photovoltaics for five years before the Department 
Energy recently allocated $14 million (in a four-year contract)15 to TI
to encourage the development of a promising new photovoltaics
technology. Photovoltaics in Texas Instruments is purely a research and
development activity at this stage. A required rate of return has
therefore not been fixed. Until the DOE grant was made, TI was
"purchasing" an option to capture profits later in the event that its
research and evelopment led to commercializable technologies.16 Their
successful R&D effort led to further infusion of internal and external
(federal and private) capital. An uncertain amount of private capital
flowed to the publicly held firm from the publicity given to the DOE
grant. The $14 million dollar grant must have tended to increase the
enthusiasm over (and therefore the price of) TI's stock to some small
degree. However, it is difficult to isolate the specific effects of the
new technology and the grants on the stock price. 17
D. Capital Availability and the Future of the Photovoltaic Industry
The experience in obtaining capital gained by photovoltaic producers
which was discussed above suggests two themes on which to focus in our
examination of future capital acquisition. First, the capital structure
of the firms which will make up this industry in the long run must be
identified. Subsumed in this task is the requirement of making the
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assumption, given the current level of government involvement, of whether
independents, oil firms, electronics firms, or some other generic
industry type will dominate the photovoltaic industry. In a related
matter our task involves questioning the future role of "small business"
in this industry. If we cannot make a reasonable guess regarding who
will be asking for capital in the future, then we cannot conclude much
about whether they will find the capital they seek in the long run.
(However, if we know the industry composition we want, federal programs
can be designed to encourage that composition.)
The second focus provided by the discussion on past experience is on
the identity and origin of the technology which will provide the
'standard' for the industry. We will call this the "watershed
technology," for its emergence will simultaneously signal a drastic
reduction in production cost, the rapid expansion of markets, and the
flow of capital to the photovoltaic industry (for originating the
watershed technology in particular) because of the positive present
values which are associated with the new technology. The firm which
originates this technology will have no problem attracting capital, nor
will firms which purchase the license to use the technology and which
have their own markets for it, nor will firms which develop variations
and/or improvements on the standard to remain competitive with the
originating firm. If a watershed technology emerges, the firm with the
flexibility to adapt will remain in the market or enter it for the first
time. Thus, the evolution of technology affects our first focus--the
composition of the industry.
There is a consensus among "subsidiary" solar producers in the
industry today that only large, capital-rich firms will survive in the
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long run. They suggest that small firms will survive (and even prosper)
not as producers of cells but as "systems" producers. That is, existing
and future independents will purchase cells from the subsidiary
manufacturer, and use them in photovoltaic systems which they construct
and customize for the end user.
Although Solarex, the largest independent, and OCLI disagree (at
least publicly) with this forecast of industry composition, Solenergy and
Sollos do expect to survive in the future by filling rather small orders
for specialized applications. Further, it is clear that Solarex has no
dearth of offers for the purchase of its business. Perhaps the primary
obstruction to its acquisition would be the development of the 'watershed
technology' by Solarex. Solarex would then become more attractive as an
acquisition, while at the same time the resolve of its owners to become
preeminent in the industry would also probably increase also. One can
only guess at the outcome.
We may conclude that, given present government attitudes and
programs, it is not unreasonable to expect the photovoltaic cell
production industry to consist in the long run entirely of wholly-owned
subsidiaries of large conglomerates. The "long run" will begin once a
watershed technology is developed and the economic wisdom of investing in
the production of photovoltaic cells for grid-connected applications is
recognized. At this time, firms with large internal capital and easy
access to external capital markets will study photovoltaic cell
production for grid-connected markets in light of their corporate
strategy and spend their own funds to expand photovoltaics operations or
to acquire either an independent photovoltaic business or a multiproduct
firm for which photovoltaics is a promising component. Under this
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forecast there will be no capital availability problem for the
photovoltaic industry.
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III. PV CONSUMERS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF CAPITAL
No market currently exists, either in the United States or abroad,
for grid-connected, residential and commercial application of
photovoltaic devices. We shall therefore study the analogous experience
in attracting private capital of those who have purchased, or wish to
purchase, passive and active solar space and water heating (we abbreviate
this as "solar heating") systems for their homes and residences. Unlike
photovoltaics, the solar heating business is well-entrenched in a few
concentrated areas of the country. The existence of these markets for
solar heating suggests that both the economics and consumer awareness of
solar heating are several years ahead of photovoltaics. We may therefore
use this solar heating example to gaze into the future to the time when
the first grid-connected photovoltaics markets develop. Caution must be
exercised in using this analogy. We cannot assume that capital
attraction for photovoltaic consumers will present problems which are
identical to those of solar heating. The product--electricity in
photovoltaics and heating in conventional solar--is different, as is the
nature of the production process and the technology used to deliver the
product (heat or electricity). That is, solar heating is a form of
advanced plumbing, while photovoltaics is a more complex technology.
The similarities between the two technologies, however, outweigh
their differences for our purposes. First, the homeowner (or the owner
of a commercial establishment) is the end-user of both. It is he or she
who must be convinced of the wisdom of purchasing each of these
technologies. Second, the issues which must be addressed by the
homeowner prior to deciding whether to purchase a solar heating or a
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conventional system are similar to the question which a prospective
consumer of photovoltaics must answer. For example, how will the cost of
alternative fuels behave over the twenty-year life of the system? And is
this new type of system reliable? Third, since capital cost "up-front"
is very high relative to operating costs, the principal obstacle to the
growth of markets is obtaining all or some of the capital to cover this
up-front cost. Fourth, the source of that capital will come from local
lending institutions; these local lenders must be satisfied that their
loans will be repaid. They will price these loans based on their
estimation of the expected savings on energy bills and on their
interpretation of the risk inherent in these technologies. The argument
is therefore persuasive that studying the availability of capital for
solar heating is one means of anticipating future capital obstruction
possibilities for photovoltaic consumers.
The debate over the wisdom of offering federal interest rate
subsidies to consumers of solar heating devices provides a focal point
for observing the experience of consumers in obtaining capital to
purchase and install solar heating devices. A major forum for this
debate is the series of hearings being conducted on Capital Hill for the
purpose of evaluating the necessity of various bills which propose the
subsidies.l8 The arguments brought to this forum will assist us in
constructing a comparison with photovoltaics, and provide background to
the arguments in this section.
It was argued above that socially-optimal investments will be made
in a well-functioning and competitive marketplace. Implicit in the
proposals for interest rate subsidies is, therefore, a criticism of the
workings of the marketplace. The possible failures in the market
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mechanism which may warrant federal intervention fall into three main
categories. A brief examination of these possible market failures
regarding consumers and lender acceptance of solar heating will help us
to anticipate possible market failures for grid-connected photovoltaics.
The categories are as follows:
(a) Energy price failure: A primary motivation for this legislation
is the rising real price and growing uncertainty of oil supplies for OPEC
states. Prospective lenders and consumers of solar technologies are as
uncertain as anyone else of the future prices of conventional fuels.
This makes life-cycle costing an exercise fraught with unusual
uncertainty--uncertainty that is generated outside of the market
mechanism in the realm of international politics. The lender cannot be
sure whether the solar investments make the consumer better or less able
to meet monthly finance charges. And the consumer remains uncertain of
the present value (if life cycle costing is used at all reaching his
investment decision) of his energy savings.
(b) Regulatory uncertainty: The unpredictable introduction or
deletion of regulation which will affect the economics of solar heating
ventures is confusing to consumers and financiers (as well as producers)
of solar technologies. Effective long-term planning is impossible if
major changes in the economics of solar investments are pending. This
thwarts solar development.
(c) Obstruction of information flow to investors: The reluctance of
many lenders to make loans to solar projects, and the hesitation of the
general public to accept even the more simple solar technologies as being
reliable and cost-effective, is in part an indication of poor public
awareness of the state of the art in solar heating. While it is true
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that solar trade magazines are now peppered with descriptions of solar
loan programs available through private lending institutions, resistance
to lending for solar projects is still widespread. In a 1977 study
commissioned by the National Science Foundationl9 it was shown that
nearly one-half of the lenders surveyed either thought that commercial
applications of solar technologies in their own areas would take more
than ten years (14% of those responding) or had no opinion at all (34%).
In addition, 53% of all lenders thought that reluctance to lend to solar
heated residences would be "great" or "substantial." Some of the
reluctance is the product of rational evaluation of the economics of
solar heating for a given region--an evaluation which leads to a reasoned
reticence. But much of this hesitation is a product of anti-solar
attitudes based on the traditionally slow-changing attitudes of the
lending community. As was shown in the producer case of Solenergy,
photovoltaic technologies are difficult to explain to bankers. As Alvin
Alm, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation at DOE explains for
the case of consumer financing:
"Lenders consider mortgages on new homes with solar energy (or
any relatively new energy technology) to be riskier than homes with
"proven" energy systems. Furthermore, the market value of the
property with the solar system is more difficult to determine and
resale values in collateral liquidation circumstances are difficult
to measure."
Thus, not only is the technology strange but a sort of "catch-22" exists
as lenders remain very stubborn of solar heating until the systems are
proven, but few systems are built because lenders are wary. Given the
hesitation of lenders towards the "advanced plumbing" of solar heating,
one can conclude that the capital supply to photovoltaics will be at
least as hard to locate.
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It is important to repeat that the existence of these legislative
proposals implies that Congress believes the marketplace is failing to
direct capital to projects which are socially optimal. Photovoltaics may
experience easier access to capital if lenders and consumers perceive
photovoltaics as a descendant of successful solar heating technologies.
If photovoltaics is subjected to the kind of hesitation which
characterizes the behavior of lenders towards solar heating, then we may
expect the market's failure to distribute adequate information to
investors, and the failure of investors to act to their advantage based
on that information to occur as well for photovoltaics. These market
failures will probably be repaired in good time for solar heating as they
would for photovoltaics without government intervention. In the interim,
however, housing and commercial structures would be built with
conventional heating, thereby unnecessarily delaying the proper
acceptance of solar technologies.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, the following conclusions are reached:
(1) It is difficult to project future participants in the industry
because photovoltaic technology is immature. No one knows who the
technological "winners" will be.
(2) However, it is probable that the mass-production photovoltaic
industry will consist entirely of wholly-owned subsidiaries of (large)
conglomerates. This agglomeration will be finalized when the watershed
technology appears in the mid to late 1980's.
(3) Small independents will survive only as suppliers to specialty,
or systems, markets; that is, to those markets requiring customized
construction of the cells themselves and/or the systems which derive and
allocate power from them.
(4) Consumers of mass-produced photovoltaics will experience
reluctance to lend on the part of financial intermediaries. This
reluctance will be of a similar magnitude to that observed towards solar
thermal heating.
(5) The solar thermal heating precedent may "pave the way" for
photovoltaics to some degree. However, energy pricing failures,
regulatory uncertainty, and obstruction of information flow to potential
customers and to financial intermediaries will slow the development of
mass photovoltaic markets.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The introduction of federal programs to subsidize photovoltaic
producers and/or consumers is ill-advised until grid-connected
photovoltaic technology stabilizes. That is, until a "standard"
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technology emerges, government subsidies to accelerate the timetable for
marketing of gria-connected photovoltaics would distort the process of
technical development by encouraging the purchase of mmature
technologies. However, once the $2.80/Wp (the "watershea") technology
emerges (most likely with considerable federal aid in the development
stages), the willingness of the industry to produce it, financial
insittutions to lend to its consumers, and consumers to buy this
technology should be closely monitored. If market development is
ponderous, some means of lubricating capital allocation will be advised.
At this time, the involvement of the currently-proposed Solar Energy
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